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Abstract
A defining property of the World Wide Web is a content site's ability to place virtually costless
hyperlinks to third-party content as a substitute or complement to its own content. Costless
hyper-linking has enabled new types of players, usually referred to as content aggregators, to
successfully enter content ecosystems, attracting traffic and revenue by hosting links to the
content of others. This, in turn, has sparked a heated controversy between content creators and
aggregators regarding the legitimacy and costs/benefits of uninhibited free linking. This work is
the first to model the complex interplay between content and links in settings where a set of sites
compete for traffic. We develop a series of analytical models that distill how hyperlinking affects
(a) the incentives of content nodes to produce quality content vs. link to third-party content, (b)
the profits of the various stakeholders, (c) the average quality of content that becomes available
to consumers, and (d) the impact of content aggregators. Our results provide a nuanced view of
the, so called, link economy, highlighting both the beneficial consequences and the drawbacks
of free hyperlinks for content creators and consumers.
1 Introduction
The ability to place hyperlinks across content is a defining feature of the World Wide Web (WWW).
Hyperlinks have transformed the notion of content from a collection of loosely related items (e.g.
books in a library) to a tightly woven network of web sites, blogs, etc. whose value comes not only
from information stored in its nodes but also from the connections among those nodes.
Hyperlinks enable content creators to substitute or complement their own content with links to
third-party content. Links are usually accompanied by a summary or commentary related to that
content. Using links in this manner is common among bloggers, who use them as a mechanism for
building a community and engaging with each other's ideas (Blood 2002). With few exceptions,
such behavior is protected under the First Amendment.1 Among other things this means that the
1See http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/copyright/copyrightarticle/hypertextlinking.cfm for a good discus-
sion of U.S. law in this area. The law may be different in different countries.
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Figure 1: Example of a news aggregator article entry
URL Description
news.google.com Algorithmically aggregated headlines and a search engine of many of the
world's news sources. Search results group similar articles together.
huffingtonpost.com Hybrid of news aggregator and original content creator.
drudgereport.com Aggregator containing selected hyperlinks to news websites all over the
world, each link carrying a headline written by the site's editors.
digg.com User-generated news aggregator. Users post links to stories and votes
promote stories to the front page.
techmeme.com Blog aggregator tracking other technology blogs.
popurls.com Meta-aggregator; aggregates links to the top stories chosen by other
aggregators.
reddit.com User-generated news aggregator. Users post links to stories and votes
promote stories to the front page.
newsvine.com Community news aggregator; member voting determines the position of
news stories.
newsnow.co.uk U.K.-based news portal.
Table 1: Examples of news aggregators.
link source does not need to seek permission, or pay royalties to the link target. On the commercial
front, hyperlinking has enabled new types of players, commonly referred to content aggregators or
web portals, to successfully enter professional content ecosystems, attracting traffic and revenue by
hosting collections of links to the content of others (Dewan et al. 2004). Aggregators produce little
or no original content; they usually provide titles and short summaries of articles they link to (Figure
1). Well known aggregators include Google News, the Drudge Report and the Huffington Post. Table
1 provides a more extensive list of examples.
The advent of the Internet has been disruptive to traditional content industries, such as news-
papers and broadcast media, that have historically focused almost exclusively on content creation.
Seeing their revenues collapse, some of them have turned against content aggregators, accusing them
of stealing their revenues by free-riding on their content.2 Some are even questioning the legitimacy
of the unilateral free linking culture of the WWW, arguing that it might lead to a tragedy of the
commons situation where content organizations are tempted to minimize the effort they spend on
2The recent dispute between the Associated Press and News Corporation with Google is perhaps the best example.
See http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/06/google-ap-newspapers-business-media-copyright.html
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original content production and rely on linking to third-party content. Other market actors point out
that, in today's link economy, links bring valuable traffic to target nodes, so content creators should
be happy that aggregators exist and direct consumers to quality content sites (Karp 2007; Jarvis
2008). Key aggregator executives, such as Google's Eric Schmidt, assert that it is to their interest to
see content creators thrive, since the value of links (and aggregators) is directly related to the quality
of content that these point to.3 The debate has already attracted the attention of governments and
regulatory bodies. For instance, in 2009-2010 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hosted three
workshops on the Future of Journalism and published a discussion draft that hints of copyright
reform that will make it more difficult to place links to third-party content without payment to the
creators of that content (FTC 2010). Moreover, the government of France has been discussing the
idea of a Google tax to be imposed on search engines and aggregators and distributed to content
creators.4
A central aspect of the debate focuses on the complex economic implications of the process of
placing (for the most part) free hyperlinks across content nodes. As previously mentioned, links are
a costless way of providing one's readers with access to third party content without incurring the cost
of producing it. But links also allow sites to coordinate and divide labor, thus avoiding duplication
of effort, e.g. situations where multiple sites end up producing similar content on the same stories.
If links are chosen well, then they point to quality content; as a result, they reduce the search costs
of the consumer population, which may lead to an aggregate increase in content consumption and to
more traffic for higher quality sites. As these simple examples show, the aggregate economic impact
of free hyperlinks on content ecosystems is not obvious, and a full understanding of the implications
of hyperlinks for a site's traffic, revenue and content strategy is overdue.
This work aims to fill this gap by approaching the problem using a game-theoretic strategic
network formation perspective. We develop a series of analytical models that distill how the ability
to place free hyperlinks affects (a) the incentives of content nodes to produce quality content vs.
link to third-party content, (b) the profits of the various stakeholders, (c) the average quality of
content that becomes available to consumers, and (d) the impact of content aggregators. Our aim
is to provide insights to both content creators as well as policy makers about how to behave and
regulate respectively the new networked content ecosystem that has emerged.
Our models highlight the complex interplay between content and links in settings where a set of
sites compete for traffic and make strategic investments in both content and links to maximize their
revenues. Specifically, we model a set of content sites (e.g. news sites) that generate revenue from
user visits (e.g. through advertising) and who compete for user attention among themselves as well
as with alternative media (e.g. TV, blogs, Twitter feeds). Each site tries to maximize the number of
visitors it receives and the amount of time they spend on the site. They do this by making decisions
about what content (if any) to produce and what other sites (if any) to link to. Users want to
maximize the utility they obtain per unit of attention and are, therefore, more likely to patronize
3CEO Eric Schmidt wishes he could rescue newspapers, Fortune January 7, 2009.
4France plans 'Google tax' on internet searches. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/6947706/France-
plans-Google-tax-on-internet-searches.html
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sites that provide them with access to better content; this content could be directly produced by a
site or simply linked to from a site. Through the use of links, sites can increase the total quality of
content that their readers can access and, thus, the number of readers they attract, usually at lower
cost than producing original content. On the other hand, original content increases the expected
amount of time that a reader spends on a site, and thus, the likelihood that s/he will click on an
ad and generate revenue for the site displaying the ad. We derive equilibrium content and linking
strategies in such settings and compare the resulting site profits and content qualities to settings
where hyperlinks are not possible. We also analyze how the entry of content aggregators affects site
profits and content qualities.
2 Related Work
Although a substantial body of literature has studied the properties of Web-based content networks
using empirical and simulation methods (for example: Huberman and Adamic 1999; Huberman et
al. 1998; Pennock et al. 2002; Wu and Huberman 2008) most of this literature has either made no
assumptions about individual agent behavior or has relied on ad-hoc and usually static agent-level
specifications. Our work, in contrast, is approaching the formation of Web content networks from
a strategic actor perspective, explicitly modeling both content organizations and users as strategic
utility-maximizing agents. We are aware of few other papers that utilize a strategic content network
formation approach, such as the one we are adopting in this paper. Katona and Sarvary (2008)
investigate strategic linking between Web sites in a market for advertising links. Utility maximizing
sites decide which other sites to buy (advertising) links from and how to price their own links. Their
paper is among the first to model the evolution of the World Wide Web as a strategic network
formation game. Building on the Katona-Sarvary model, Kominers (2009) examines the strategic
production of sticky content in commercial sites that generate revenues from both selling services
and selling links. A crucial question not fully addressed by the aforementioned papers is how links
that are freely established contribute to the ecosystem and what motivates their formation. Mayzlin
and Yoganarasimhan (2010) study a blogger's strategic decision to link or not link to a competitor's
blog. Their work is focused on capturing a blogger's local link formation decision and does not
attempt to analyze the system-level consequences of such decisions on network structure, content
quality and social welfare. Ma (2010) conducts an empirical study of the implications of strategic
linking within a website between individuals who post reviews. He finds that reciprocal linking is
a natural outcome of the dynamic decisions since nodes have an incentive to increase viewership of
others that link to them. This result is an empirical complement to some of our results, but does
not examine the question of aggregators or different costs of production which are central to the
examination of the more general web-based content creation industry. Chiou and Tucker (2011)
conduct an empirical study of how the presence of news aggregators affects traffic to news websites.
Their study recognizes some of the same trade-offs that motivate our own study.
Our results also contribute to the literature of strategic network formation (Jackson 2008). The
majority of models that have been studied in that literature fall under one of two categories: first,
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models where a set of fixed-attribute nodes make strategic link formation decisions (for example: Bala
and Goyal 2000; Bloch and Dutta 2009; Kleinberg et al. 2008), and second, models where nodes that
are connected together in a fixed network play a strategic game that requires them to make decisions
about effort or some other node-specific strategic variable (for example: Bramoulle and Kranton
2007; Galeotti et al. 2006). In contrast, our models involve simultaneous and interdependent node-
level strategic decisions about both node properties (e.g. effort to invest in original content) and link
decisions (e.g. how many links to form and to whom to link to).
We are aware of only one paper that looks at interdependent content and link formation decisions:
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) study a setting where identical nodes looking for information can either
directly invest in acquiring it or form connections with others who already have it. They show that
every robust equilibrium of this model exhibits the law of the few: a small number of nodes invest in
acquiring information and everyone else links to them. Our work has similarities but also important
differences to theirs. In terms of similarities, we also find that, under certain conditions, competing
nodes form link equilibria where one site makes high investments in content and other sites link to
it. In our setting, however, nodes are in competition: node revenue has a positive relationship with
the quality of information a node offers to consumers relative to every other node. This provides an
incentive for nodes to abandon link equilibria and try to outdo one another by investing in original
content. For that reason, we find that equilibria that exhibit law of the few properties often do not
form. We also allow for nodes of heterogeneous ability as well as assume the presence of aggregators
and alternative media; this enriches our results in important ways.
In a different context, Steiner (1952) examined quality competition among radio broadcasts in
content creation and showed that this competition sometimes results in overproduction of content
beyond what is socially optimal. Though our work is different in that it allows for linking and, as a
result, dramatically alters the situation, some of the same results still hold.
Several of our results have analogies with results obtained in the literature on compatibility (see
Katz and Shapiro 1994 and references contained therein). However, the mechanisms that drive those
results do not hold in exactly the same way for linking as opposed to compatibility. Compatibility
increases every consumer's willingness to pay due to network effects (consumers experience higher
utility as part of a single large network than of two smaller networks). Linking increases consumers'
willingness to pay due to the higher quality content that it now becomes rational for the link target
to produce (this content becomes available to all via linking). Linking, further, increases joint profits
because it also reduces the wasted effort of both sites investing in high quality content.
An important impact of aggregators on content ecosystems is the reduction of search costs, which
points to the consumer search literature (e.g. Wolinsky 1984; Bakos 1997). Alba et al. (1997) showed
that consumers seek out platforms which will decrease search costs. Though they were discussing
physical products, our work supports this finding when it comes to content aggregators. Lal and
Sarvary (1999) and Lynch and Ariely (2000) show that, in some contexts, the Internet increases
competition due to the ability to quickly compare between different sites. We find that the market
entry of aggregators increases competition among content sites, for similar reasons. Other work
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(Ratchford et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2004) has found that consumer search costs are affected by
familiarity with the network and with a particular site. In this paper we do not specifically address
consumer expertise, but it is one potential consumer motivation behind the notion of anchor sites
that we will discuss in the next Section.
3 Model
We study a setting where N content sites (e.g. news websites) are competing with each other to
attract and monetize user traffic. To maintain tractability, we assume that in each period there is
only one topic of interest (e.g. one newsworthy story, chosen by nature) and that site i = 1, .., N
produces content of quality ci ≥ 0 on this topic. In addition to content creation, sites can place links
to selected content of other sites. In the setting of this paper sites have no incentive to link to more
than one other site (see discussion at the beginning of Section 6). Sites will, therefore, contain at
most one link. Links are usually accompanied by a link description, a snippet of text that describes
something about the link target's content or an excerpt of the link target's content. In the context
of a blogger, this link description could in fact be an entire paragraph or blog post describing and
commenting on the link, or in the case of an aggregator, such as Google News, it could simply be
the title of the article and 2-3 lines taken from either the text or the meta-data of the link target
(Figure 1).5 Within the model, site i's cost of producing content of quality ci is
ki
2 c
2
i . Linking, on
the other hand, is free and links cannot be refused by link targets in our basic model.
Users and Traffic. A population of users/consumers visits content sites and the consumers
derive utility from reading the content on these sites. Each period, every consumer begins her session
from a site that we will refer to as the consumer's anchor site. The notion of an anchor site is based
on the fact that recent research has shown that consumers tend to use a small number of sites when
they start consuming news (Purcell, 2010). At the anchor site, she spends some time on the site
reading its content and potentially clicks on one or more links and reads the content at the link
target. To keep the setup parsimonious we assume that consumers who visit link target sites do
not click on any other links while there. Since in the model we assume that all content is on the
same topic, we treat different pieces of content as substitutes. Therefore, if site i has own content ci
and links to site j, consumers can expect to gain utility zi = max(ci, δcj) by choosing site i as their
anchor site. Factor δ ∈ [0, 1] captures the disutility of accessing content via a link, as opposed to
directly. For example, this can be related to the cognitive cost of clicking on a link and reorienting
oneself to a different context, i.e., a new web page layout. In most cases this disutility is small. To
reduce notational clutter in the rest of the paper we will, therefore, assume δ = 1.6
5There exists controversy on whether the unauthorized reproduction of excerpts (or even the title) of content to
which one links constitutes a violation of copyright or whether it is covered by the fair use provisions of copyright
legislation. Our model captures the implications of this practice and allows us to make theory-driven arguments about
its social benefits and costs.
6We cover the case of δ < 1 in a separate Technical Appendix.
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New consumers are unaware of the content quality offered by each site and choose a random
anchor site. All consumers aim to maximize the utility they receive from content so they periodically
switch anchor sites using an exploration-exploitation process akin to a multi-armed bandit problem
(Dubins and Savage 1965). In reality users often combine random browsing, the use of search
engines, recommendations from their social networks, etc. when deciding what sites to use for
news consumption. Regardless of the specific mechanisms employed, as consumers become more
experienced it is expected that they will spend more time anchored at high utility sites.
Our objective is to derive a static model that captures the steady state properties of the dynamic
game between content producers and consumers so that we can focus our attention on the competition
among content creators. If we make the assumption that every period some consumers leave the
ecosystem, i.e., they switch to alternative forms of content consumption, whereas an equal number of
new (uninformed) consumers enter, then in the steady state, the population will include consumers
at different stages of their exploration of the content ecosystem. Under this assumption, at steady
state every node will have some traffic and the number tAi of consumers who anchor themselves at
node i (the anchor traffic of site i) will be an increasing function of node i's user utility zi and a
decreasing function of every other node's utility. One function that satisfies these properties and
lends itself to analytical tractability is a Tullock contest success function (Tullock 1980), commonly
used to relate the probability of winning a contest (in this case, attracting traffic to one's site) to
the resources each contestant devotes to it:
tAi (zi) =
zi∑N
j=1 zj + µ
(1)
In the rest of the paper we will use the above function as our specification of anchor traffic.
Factor µ ≥ 0 represents the utility that consumers expect to get outside the content ecosystem
(e.g. by watching TV, exchanging Twitter messages, or simply having a live discussion on current
events with friends). The presence of this factor underlies the fact that, however we delimit them,
media ecosystems are almost invariably in competition with something else (an outside alternative)
for consumer attention. The outside alternative can be another medium or simply another activity
that consumers have the option of engaging in instead of consuming content. Therefore, if a site
increases the utility zi it offers to users, not only will it attract users away from other sites within
the same ecosystem but also from the outside alternative. For example, if an online news site
offers a revolutionary new way of accessing interesting content, it will attract visitors not only from
competing online news sites but also from traditional TV. In fact, the above specification implies
that, the higher the µ, the higher the percentage of additional traffic for site i that will come from
the outside alternative versus from other sites of the content ecosystem. Restating this from the
perspective of every other site, the higher the µ, the lower the relative impact of the change in any
site's strategy on everybody else's traffic. The presence of an outside alternative, thus, tends to
soften the competition among sites of the same ecosystem. As we will see in the following sections,
this softening of competition plays an important role in enabling the formation of linking equilibria
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that improve the profits of some or all content sites.
Site Revenues. We assume that site revenue (e.g. from advertising) is proportional to the
total time visitors spend there. Once a consumer arrives at her anchor site, if there are no links she
stays there for time proportional to the quality of available content. Let mi denote the marginal
revenue that site i earns. As this is a function of time spent per user and time spent is a function of
content, it is mi = m(ci) . To keep the presentation simple we assume that m(c) = c. With this, if
there are no links in the system, the total revenue of a site becomes:
Ri = t
A
i (ci)ci (2)
The situation changes if we allow sites to place links to each other. Suppose that there is a single
link from site i to site j. As we will show, in our setting it is only rational to place links to content
of better quality. Therefore, the presence of a link implies that cj > ci. We assume that consumers
behave as follows: Upon visiting site i, with probability ρ a consumer stays on the site and consumes
its content without clicking the link, whereas with probability 1− ρ she clicks a link and consumes
site j′s content without consuming site i's content.
We can justify such consumer behavior as follows: Assume that there are two different types
of readers: Readers who only care about (i.e. receive maximum utility from reading) a summary
of a topic and readers who are interested in every single detail. Consider, for example, an article
on a football game. Some readers would be fully satisfied from the article by learning the game's
final score and would get no extra utility from reading more details. Others might want a detailed
description of how well the two teams played. Let us call the former type shallow readers and the
latter type deep readers. Assume that, whenever sites link to other sites, they include a summary
of the target site's additional content (i.e. a summary of the content that is present at the target
site and not at the source site). This assumption is consistent with the way that links to third-party
content are used in news articles and news aggregators (see, for example, Figure 1). Shallow readers
who have read the source content and link content summary would get no additional utility from
visiting the link target.7 Deep readers, on the other hand, will be better off if they click and move
to the link target immediately.
We assume that a reader's type (shallow/deep) during a particular reading session depends on
a variety of factors, such as how interested the reader is on the topic, how busy the reader is at
the moment, how extensive and descriptive is the content summary that accompanies the link, etc.
The same person can, thus, sometimes behave as a shallow reader and, at other times, as a deep
reader. Let ρ denote the expected value of a reader behaving as a shallow reader when we take
into consideration the entire population of readers, as well as the probability distribution of topics,
reading times, etc. We, then, obtain the hypothesized behavior. Such behavior is consistent with
7In fact, if we assume that the cognitive cost of reading an article is proportional to its content quality, shallow
readers would be strictly better off reading the (lower quality) anchor node content plus the (cognitively inexpensive)
link summary than the link target content.
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rational consumers who recognize that the link target always offers better content than the link
source.
For the sake of parsimony, we assume that the factor ρ is an exogenous constant.8 For a given
distribution of readers and topics, ρ also depends on the amount of information contained in the
excerpt/snippet that accompanies the link (Figure 1). Palme et al. (2012) have experimentally
shown that, the longer the snippet length, the higher the ρ. Our comparative statics with respect
to ρ can, thus, be interpreted as showing the implications of allowing aggregators to place longer
snippets of articles they link to. The limiting case ρ = 1 models settings where site i reproduces all
salient aspects of the content of site j.9
The preceding discussion shows that linking has both advantages and disadvantages. By placing
a link, the source site can become a more attractive anchor node to consumers since it can now offer
them access to better content, even if that content is a click away. Specifically, whereas without links
the expected consumer utility from visiting site i would be zi = ci, placement of a link to site j whose
content satisfies cj > ci allows site i to increase its expected utility to z
′
i = max(ci, cj) = cj > zi. By
(1), higher utility implies higher anchor traffic, i.e. tAi (cj) > t
A
i (ci). (This argument shows that it is
only rational to place links to sites that offer better content.) The main disadvantage of placing a
link to a site of better content is that a fraction 1 − ρ of visitors will now click through directly to
the better content, and these visitors will leave no revenue to the source site.
The trade-offs for the link target are exactly the opposite. The advantage of being a link target
is that additional visitors arrive through that link. The disadvantage is that, as discussed in the
previous paragraph, the link source can free ride on the link target's superior content, decreasing
the target's relative attractiveness as an anchor node and, by (1), its anchor traffic. The number of
visitors that reach j through a link from i to j (where ci < cj) is equal to the traffic (1 − ρ)tAi (cj)
leaving site i. Thus, the total incoming link traffic of site j is:
tLj (cj) = (1− ρ)
l∑
k=1
tAik(cj)
where i1, ..., il are the sites linking to j. We assume that visitors that arrive to site j through links
consume its content and do not click on any further links present on j. The total revenue of a site
in the possible presence of links then becomes:
Ri =

tAi (ci)ci if site i is neither a link source nor a target
ρtAi (cj)ci if site i links to another site j but is not a link target(
tAi (ci) + t
L
i (ci)
)
ci if site i is a link target but not a source(
ρtAi (cj) + t
L
i (ci)
)
ci if site i links to another site j and is also a link target
(3)
8In a separate Technical Appendix we analyze settings where ρ is a declining function of link target quality. We
find that such alternative specifications introduce additional complexity without offering substantial new insights. We
chose to stay with the simplest possible model.
9In most practical settings this limiting case would probably constitute a violation of copyright. We include it in
our analysis both for completeness as well as a worst-case scenario benchmark.
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The following sections analyze the competitive interactions among content sites in the above
setting. In all cases we study a simultaneous move game where sites simultaneously decide how
much to invest in content, as well as if and which other sites to link to.
4 Two sites
We derive our first set of insights by studying a setting with just two content sites. Our objective is
to examine how the option of placing free links to third-party content affects competition, content
quality and site profits in such a simple setting.10
4.1 Payoff functions
Depending on the context we will refer to the two sites either using subscripts 1, 2 or S, T , the latter
indicating the source and target of a link respectively. When there are no links between the two
sites the expected utility for site i is zi = ci, the link traffic for site i is t
A
i = ci/(ci + cj + µ) , and,
given that site i's cost of creating content is increasing in the square of the content created by the
site then its payoff function is given by:
pii =
ci
ci + cj + µ
ci − ki
2
c2i . (4)
Once we introduce the possibility of placing free links to other sites' content is it easy to see that
it is never individually rational for any site S to place a link to a site T of equal or lower content.
Specifically, placing a link to content cT ≤ cS does not change the utility zS = max(cS , cT ) consumers
get from making site S their anchor, and therefore does not increase site S's anchor traffic. At the
same time, per (3), the presence of the link decreases the source site's revenue per visitor by a
factor ρ. Therefore, either no site will link to the other or the site with (strictly) lower content
will link to the peer with better content. Under these assumptions, when site S links to site T the
relationship between content for the two sites must be governed by cS < cT , and the utility expected
by consumers for the two sites is: zS = cT and zT = cT . Together with (1), these relationships
imply that the traffic for the two sites will be: tAS = t
A
T = cT /(2cT + µ). From (3) the corresponding
payoff functions then take the form:
piS =
cT
2cT + µ
ρcS − kS
2
c2S piT =
cT + (1− ρ)cT
2cT + µ
cT − kT
2
c2T (5)
For expositional clarity we first look at the case where the two sites have identical cost parameters
ki = 1. In Section 4.3 we study the more general case where one site is more efficient than the other.
10Section 6 shows that the results obtained in this Section remain qualitatively robust in settings with multiple
content sites.
10
4.2 Homogeneous sites
When sites are homogeneous and if there are no links, then sites simply maximize the profit function
described in (4), yielding tA1 = t
A
2 =
cNL
2cNL+µ
and
c∗1 = c
∗
2 = cNL =
3− 4µ+√9 + 8µ
8
(6)
When µ > 2, this expression becomes negative. We will thus assume µ < 2 throughout the
analysis to avoid this situation. Further examining the equilibrium described by (6), one can derive
that it is Pareto dominated by the symmetric outcome that maximizes sites' profits:
c1 = c2 = cP =
2− 4µ+√4 + 16µ
8
< cNL
The above outcome arises e.g. in settings with geographical segregation, where each site has
exclusive access to one half of the audience and only competes with the outside option.11
In common with many similar settings, it follows that, when
two homogeneous content sites compete for the same audience, they produce better content, but
end up with lower profits, relative to a setting where each site has exclusive access to one half of the
audience.
This result captures an important consequence for the news industry (and other, previously
geographically segregated, content industries) of technologies, such as the Web, that allow individuals
to gather information for free (or cheaply) from any content-producing site around the world. Sites
that previously had monopoly power over their respective audience segments now have to compete
with each other for the entire audience. Competition induces higher investment in, what is essentially
duplicate content. Because increased content investments are symmetric, they do not change relative
market shares and result in reduced profits for all sites.
We will show that under certain circumstances sites can use the option of linking to alleviate
counter-productive investments in duplicate content. The following proposition characterizes the
form of the resulting equilibria.
Proposition 1. There exist thresholds L(ρ), NL(ρ) ∈ [0, 2] such that:
1. If µ ≤ NL(ρ) then sites do not establish links in equilibrium and c∗i = c∗j = cNL.
2. If µ ≥ L(ρ) then there are two asymmetric equilibria where one site links to the other and
cT =
1− µ
2
− ρ
4
+
√
(2− ρ)(4µ+ 2− ρ)
4
>
cS =
ρcT
2cT + µ
11The payoff functions of this alternative setting are given by: pii =
ci
2ci+µ
ci − ki2 c2i .
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regions when the two content sites have identical cost parameters and δ = 1.
3. There is no equilibrium in pure strategies otherwise.
The most striking part of the above result is the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium, in
which one site produces high quality content, whereas the other site gives up content competition
and links to the high content site. Section 6 shows that this result generalizes in settings with multiple
nodes. In real world terms, this result corresponds to situations where one target newspaper invests
heavily in quality content on a topic, and all other newspapers link to it, without trying to compete
by producing what would, essentially, be duplicate content on the same topic. Although the concept
of linking to competitors has, traditionally, been an anathema to most newspapers, in recent years
we are witnessing new players, such as the Huffington Post, who have built efficient and successful
news organizations by covering few stories themselves and linking to high quality (competing) news
outlets for the rest.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium regions. Symmetric no-link equilibria exist in the region below
curve NL(ρ); asymmetric link equilibria exist in the region above curve L(ρ). As ρ grows, linking
becomes an attractive option for the link source because it retains a higher percentage of anchor
traffic. Accordingly, as ρ grows, the region where no-link equilibria are sustainable shrinks and the
region where link equilibria are sustainable grows (except for large ρ, see below). Observe, also, that
asymmetric link equilibria are sustainable only for sufficiently large values of µ. The intuition for
this, as well as the details of the linking equilibria are different when ρ is small and when ρ is large.
Small ρ. For δ = 1, when one site links to the other, then both sites offer the same expected
utility to consumers, and end up sharing the total traffic that comes to the content ecosystem. This
reduces the competition between them for market share. Furthermore, in the presence of an outside
alternative (µ > 0), higher content investments by the link target benefit both the target and the
source, because the new customers who will be attracted away from the outside alternative will be
split between the link source and target. When ρ is small, many of the visitors of the link source
12
(a) Content (b) Payoffs
Figure 3: Equilibrium content and payoffs when ρ = 0.5 (k = δ = 1)
end up clicking through and generating revenue for the link target. For every unit of additional
investment in content, the link target thus (a) increases the number of visitors that come from the
outside alternative both to itself and to the link source, and (b) is able to capture additional revenue
both from the new visitors that come to itself as well as from a fraction 1 − ρ of the new visitors
that come to the link source. Therefore, the presence of an outside alternative allows the link target
to invest in substantially better content than in a no-link equilibrium. This, in turn, makes it very
difficult for the link source to compete with the link target in a content (no-link) equilibrium. If µ
is sufficiently large, the additional traffic that the link source receives (thanks to the increase in the
link target's content) compensates it for the fact that it only retains a fraction ρ of the corresponding
revenue. Both these forces make it more profitable for the link source to form a link, albeit with
lower content and lower profits than the link target, than to attempt to compete directly with the
link target on content.
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium content and payoffs for ρ = 0.5. For these parameters the
asymmetric equilibria become sustainable for µ > 0.62. Observe that cS < cNL < cT and piNL < piT ,
and therefore consumers and the link target are better off in the presence of links. In fact, the link
target is even better off than in the Pareto optimal setting where each site has a monopoly over half
the consumer population. The link source is always worse off relative to the link target. Interestingly,
however, if µ is sufficiently large (µ > 1 in this example), the link source also ends up better off
relative to the no link case because it receives revenue from a lot of additional visitors (attracted
away from the outside alternative) while spending less on original content costs.
Large ρ. When ρ is large (implying that the link source captures a large portion of the advertising
revenue) then the potential link target does not benefit much from link traffic. However, the reduced
competition between itself and the other site allows the link target to reduce its content investment
and bring its content levels down to the Pareto optimal cP , a move that in the end results in
increased profits for the link target. If there is no outside alternative (µ = 0) such a move would not
be sustainable: Lower content investment by the link target would give an incentive to the link source
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to abandon the link and invest heavily in content itself. However, if µ exceeds a certain level (i.e., the
outside alternative is significantly high), then the potential link target has an incentive to maintain
a higher level of investment in order to not lose traffic to the outside alternative. This makes it more
difficult for the potential link source to compete without linking to its competitor, making it more
attractive for the link source to free-ride on the target's content as opposed to deviating.12
The following corollary states the general form of these relationships:
Corollary 1. The equilibrium content levels and profits satisfy:
cS ≤ cP ≤ cT and piNL ≤ piP ≤ piT
For low values of ρ it is also the case that:
cNL ≤ cT , piS ≤ piT and piS ≤ piNL
In summary, in settings where there are two evenly matched competitors, the option of placing
links across sites may lead to equilibria where one or both sites are better off relative to a no-link
setting. Even though some details depend on the magnitude of ρ, in all cases linking helps reduce
the inefficiency present in the no linking case that is due to, from the perspective of content sites,
excessive investment on substitute content, driven by competition.
4.3 Heterogeneous sites
In the more general case the two competing sites have different abilities to produce content. We
capture this by assuming different cost parameters k1 = 1 and k2 = k > 0. Therefore, if k2 < 1,
then site 2 is more efficient than the site 1, and if k2 > 1 then site 1 is more efficient.
If there are no links, then sites maximize profit as described in (4), yielding the following result:
Proposition 2. When two heterogeneous sites compete for the same audience and cannot form links
then:
1. If the difference in their cost parameters is not too large then both competitors produce content
and capture a positive market share; the more efficient (lower cost) competitor produces better
content and captures a higher market share.
2. If the difference in their cost parameters is large, market entry of the less efficient content
producer is not viable; the more efficient competitor then becomes a monopolist.
The most striking property of the above result is that there is no room for a second competitor
whose content production cost is substantially higher than that of the most efficient content producer.
12The link target's reduced content investment and the source's correspondingly increased temptation to abandon
the link and compete on content explains the non-monotonicity of L(ρ) for large ρ.
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(a) ρ = 0.25 (b) ρ = 0.75
Figure 4: Equilibrium regions when sites have heterogeneous costs and links are possible. The white
regions are regions where no pure equilibria exist.
The ability to place links to the other site's content becomes even more important in this setting
as it now allows inefficient sites, that would otherwise not be able to viably enter the market, to
generate positive profits. The following proposition provides the details.
Proposition 3. There exist thresholds L12(k, ρ), L21(k, ρ), NL(k, ρ) such that:
1. If µ ≤ NL(k, ρ), an equilibrium exists where sites do not establish links in equilibrium. Their
content levels are then given by (10).
2. If µ ≥ L21(k, ρ), an equilibrium exists where site 2 links to site 1 and
c1 = cT =
1− µ
2
− ρ
4
+
√
(2− ρ)(4µ+ 2− ρ)
4
>
c2 = cS =
ρcT
k (2cT + µ)
3. If µ ≥ L12(k, ρ), an equilibrium exists where site 1 links to site 2 and
c2 = cT =
1− kµ
2k
− ρ
4k
+
√
(2− ρ)(4kµ+ 2− ρ)
4k
>
c1 = cS =
ρcT
2cT + µ
4. There is no equilibrium in pure strategies otherwise.
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(a) Regions of lower profit (b) Regions of lower content
Figure 5: The areas that are below and to the right of each of the above curves represent parameter
regions when site 1 ends up worse off and produces lower content when links are allowed relative to
a setting where no links are possible.
Figure 4 depicts the parameter regions where each of the above equilibria become possible. As
expected, high cost (inefficient) sites will link to low cost (efficient) sites, especially when the cost
differential is high. For example, we see that site 2 links to site 1 when k > 1 and that site 1 links
to site 2 when k < 1. An important observation is that the ability to link to a more efficient site
always makes it individually rational for a site, no matter how inefficient, to enter the market and
capture positive market share. This is in stark contrast to the situation without links, where market
entry is not viable for very inefficient sites.
Figure 5 depicts the parameter regions where link equilibria result in higher or lower profits and
content for the link target (relative to equilibria where no links are possible).13 It is interesting to
contrast these to the corresponding results of the previous section. In settings with sites of equal
capability to produce content, when linking is sustainable, it always results in higher profits for the
link target, because it reduces the inefficiency of duplicate content investment when the two (evenly
matched) sites compete head-on. When sites have different capabilities this result only holds (a) when
the two sites do not have large differences in their cost parameters, or (b) when µ is sufficiently large
compared to ρ. Specifically, observe that in Figure 5 for each ρ there exist thresholds kT (ρ), µT (ρ)
such that, when k > kT (ρ) (i.e. when site 2 is sufficiently less efficient than site 1) the link target
realizes higher profits only when µ > µT (ρ). Furthermore, it appears that µT (ρ) is an increasing
function of ρ. Similar patterns govern the production of content.
The intuition behind the result is that, without linking, if a site is substantially more efficient
than its competitor it will capture the entire market and will produce the monopoly content levels.
Linking allows sites that would otherwise not be viable competitors to stay on the market, free-
13We only depict results for equilibria where site 2 links to site 1. Equilibria where site 1 links to site 2 have
symmetric properties.
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riding on the efficient site's content and (for ρ > 0) capturing some revenue that would otherwise
go to the link target. This decreases the efficient site's profits, as well as its incentives to produce
content. At the same time, however, the market entry of the new site attracts some traffic away
from the outside alternative and thus expands the total traffic flowing into the content ecosystem.
To see why this happens observe that the new site links to content of quality cT . When site T
is the only content site, the total traffic that flows into the content ecosystem is equal to cTcT+µ .
After the entry of the less efficient site the total traffic that flows into the new ecosystem (i.e. to
sites S and T ) is 2cT2cT+µ ≥
cT
cT+µ
, with the inequality strict for µ > 0. This specification models
the fact that every additional node entering the ecosystem represents an additional path to good
content. The existence of more paths makes it more likely that consumers will stumble upon such
content, effectively reducing their search costs. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of the
entire content ecosystem relative to the outside alternative, attracting some traffic (e.g. audience
and/or time spent) away from it . If ρ is small compared to µ, most of the additional traffic that
flows to the link source clicks on its link and lands on the link target, compensating the target for the
loss of market share and revenue incurred by the entry of the link source site. If ρ is large, however,
the net effect of the new node's entry for the link target's profits and content is negative.
The trade-off discussed in the previous paragraph is at the core of the controversy surrounding
aggregators. We explore it more formally in the next section.
5 Aggregators
In this section, we consider the entry of sites that have a very high cost of content production and,
thus, can only attract visitors by linking to content created by others. These sites are usually called
aggregators. To better highlight the complex impact of aggregators on content networks we first
examine the direct effect of an aggregator in a setting where the incumbent content sites do not
change their content and linking behavior as a response to the aggregator's entry. Then, we study
how incumbents react to aggregator entry by changing their content level and how this affects the
competition between content creators.
5.1 The main effect of aggregators on traffic and revenue
We assume three sites and fix their content decisions. Site 3 is a new entrant, an aggregator with a
very high content creation cost. Such a site will produce almost no content and will place a link to the
site that produces the highest content since that will attract the largest audience to the aggregator.
We study how the presence of this player changes the payoffs of the other two sites. To do this we
look at two scenarios:
1. Sites 1 and 2 produce the same amount of content c1 = c2 and there are no links between them
2. One site (e.g. site 2) produces lower quality content and links to the other site (site 1).
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In both scenarios we assume that the aggregator links to content of quality c1 and, thus, offers utility
c1 to consumers. Without the aggregator, the total traffic that flows into the content ecosystem
(sites 1 and 2) is equal to c1+c2c1+c2+µ . With the aggregator the total traffic that flows into the new
ecosystem (sites 1, 2 and 3) is 2c1+c22c1+c2+µ >
c1+c2
c1+c2+µ
. This specification models the fact that, by
providing additional entry points for accessing good content, the presence of aggregators increases
the attractiveness of the content ecosystem relative to outside alternatives (e.g. it reduces consumer
search costs). This, in turn, increases the total traffic that flows into the entire content ecosystem.
The impact of aggregators on individual content site traffic is two-fold. On the one hand
ci
2c1+c2+µ
< cic1+c2+µ , which means that aggregator entry reduces the anchor traffic of all incumbent
content sites. Aggregators, therefore, attract anchor traffic away both from the outside alternative
as well as from every other content site. On the other hand, a fraction 1 − ρ of the aggregator's
anchor traffic clicks on its link and eventually lands at the high content site. If ρ is not very high,
the link from the aggregator thus allows the high content site to recover most of the original traffic
that it lost to the aggregator and also part of the additional traffic that flows to the aggregator
from the outside alternative. The high content site then ends up better off in the presence of the
aggregator. In contrast, as ρ approaches one, the aggregator retains almost all its anchor traffic, and
this results to a net loss for all incumbent content sites. Of course, the low content site is always
worse off since it loses audience share to the aggregator and gains none of it back. The following
proposition formalizes the above discussion:
Proposition 4. (1) If sites 1 and 2 produce the same content and do not link to each other, then
they are better off in the presence of an aggregator iff
ρ < ρˆNL =
µ
2c1 + µ
(2) If site 1 produces higher content and site 2 links to it then site 1 is better off in the presence
on an aggregator iff
ρ < ρˆT =
µ
c1 + µ
whereas site 2 is always worse off. The sum of the profits that sites 1 and 2 make is higher in the
presence of an aggregator iff
ρ < ρˆ =
µ
c2 + c1 + µ
< ρˆT
Proposition 4 can help explain the current tension between content producers and news aggrega-
tors, e.g. the controversy between the Associated Press and Google News, discussed in the paper's
introduction. Aggregators claim that their presence ought to be beneficial to high quality content
producers because they link and, thus, direct traffic to them. Nevertheless, all aggregator visitors
were originally (before aggregators appeared) visitors of one of the content producers, so aggregators
indeed stole some anchor traffic away from content producers. Furthermore, a fraction % of aggre-
gator anchor traffic is satisfied reading article titles and snippets posted by the aggregator (Figure
1), and does not click through to visit any content sites. This lost traffic represents a net loss for
content producers, and the main source of their complaints.
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At the same time, by making it easier for consumers to access good content, aggregators increase
the attractiveness of the entire content ecosystem and, thus, also attract traffic away from alternative
media. A fraction 1− % of this additional traffic is directed, via the aggregator, to the high quality
content producer's site. If this additional traffic is substantial enough, it can compensate high quality
content producers for the anchor traffic lost to the aggregator. This can happen when µ is large and
% is small. In such cases the net impact of the aggregator to high quality content producers can be
positive.
It is interesting to observe that the presence of an outside alternative, and, thus, the opportunity
to expand the total traffic that flows into the content ecosystem, is essential for aggregators to
be beneficial. Aggregators can never be beneficial to incumbent sites in closed universe settings
where there is no outside audience to be attracted. This is easy to see in our model: when µ = 0,
Proposition 4 predicts that incumbent sites are better off in the presence of aggregators if and only
if ρ < 0, which can never occur.
5.2 The competitive effect of aggregators
In this section, we allow sites 1 and 2 to endogenously adjust their content and link formation
decisions when an aggregator enters the market. As before, our key assumption is that aggregators
create very little content of their own but contain a single link that points to the best available
content. This assumption captures the content filtering role of aggregators: in real-life aggregators
do not link to all available content on a topic; instead they make selections for a number of reasons.
For example, consumers might have limited cognitive budgets and thus are willing to follow one link
at most. Alternatively, there may be screen size constraints that limit the number of possible links,
especially in mobile browsing environments. In summary, the main added value of aggregators is as
filters.
We assume that the aggregator cannot perfectly determine the content levels of the incumbents,
but links to the high content site with high probability. When there is no link between the two
incumbents, the aggregator will link to site 1 with probability
cs1
cs1+c
s
2
,where s ≥ 0 is the amount of
search that the aggregator does. When s = 0 the aggregator is unable to determine quality and
randomly chooses between the two sites. When s = 1, the aggregator is only as good as consumers
in finding the best sites. If s→∞ the aggregator can find the top site with perfect precision. Since
the two incumbents know each other's content well, we further assume that a link between them
indicates that the link target has a higher content. Thus, if links exist, the aggregator will always
link to the link target.14
Under the above assumptions, aggregator entry induces competition among the two incumbent
sites for the aggregator's link and its associated traffic. We will now perform an analysis similar to
that of Section 4.2 in this new setting and investigate how the competition induced by the aggregator
affects the results. Our main objective is to explore how the aggregator's search parameter s affects
14The assumption that aggregators use the link structure as a cue to content quality is consistent with actual
practice. For example, the PageRank algorithm that forms the backbone of the Google search engine ranks sites on
the basis of how many incoming links they receive from other, similarly highly ranked, sites.
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content investments, profits and the propensity of content sites to form links. To keep things simple,
we only study the case where the two incumbent sites have identical cost parameters ki = 1.
5.2.1 Incumbents are pure content creators
First, we look at the case when the two incumbents are pure content creators who (for strategic or
policy reasons) do not consider placing links to each other. Player i expects that it will be linked
to from the aggregator with probability
csi
csi+c
s
j
. If so, the aggregator's utility to consumers will be ci
and thus the content ecosystem will effectively consist of three nodes with total content ci + ci + cj
competing against the outside alternative µ. Node i's anchor traffic will then be equal to ci2ci+cj+µ .
The aggregator's anchor traffic will also be ci2ci+cj+µ . A fraction 1 − ρ of that traffic will click the
aggregator's link and will visit node i. The total traffic of node i will thus be equal to ci+(1−ρ)ci2ci+cj+µ .
With probability
csj
csi+c
s
j
the aggregator will choose to link to node j. In that case (a) the total content
offered by the content ecosystem will become ci+ cj + cj , (b) node i's anchor traffic will be
ci
ci+2cj+µ
,
and (c) there will be no link traffic flowing to node i. Putting everything together the expected
payoff of player i is given by:
pii =
csi
csi + c
s
j
· ci + (1− ρ)ci
2ci + cj + µ
ci +
csj
csi + c
s
j
· ci
ci + 2cj + µ
ci − 1
2
c2i . (7)
We determine the symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 1. When µ < (3−ρ)
(
1− s 3(1−ρ)2(5−2ρ)
)
or, equivalently, s < 2(5−2ρ)(3−ρ−µ)3(1−ρ)(3−ρ) and content creators
do not have the option of linking to each other, equilibrium content levels are
c∗1 = c∗2 = cNL
= 1336 + s
1−ρ
24 − 3µ+ρ9 +
√
9(1−ρ)2s2+12(1−ρ)(13−4ρ)s+64ρ2−(192µ+416)ρ+480µ+676
72
(8)
and the profits are
pi∗1 = pi
∗
2 = piNL =
c2NL(3− µ− ρ− 3cNL)
2(3cNL + µ)
.
Otherwise, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies and piNL = 0.
The lemma reveals the disruptive effect of an aggregator on the competition between content
creators. It is easy to see that, as long as ρ < 1, equilibrium content levels are increasing and
profit levels are decreasing in s. The intuition is that the more effective the aggregator is at finding
the better site, the more the incumbent sites compete for the incoming link by investing in content
above the level that is optimal for them. In fact, if s > 2(5−2ρ)(3−ρ−µ)3(1−ρ)(3−ρ) , the only equilibria are mixed
equilibria that leave both content sites with zero profits.
The following proposition generalizes these intuitions and also examines the rather surprising
impact of ρ on content and profits.
Proposition 5. The symmetric equilibrium of Lemma 1 exhibits the following properties:
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1. Equilibrium content is monotonically increasing in s and decreasing in ρ.
2. Equilibrium profits are monotonically decreasing in s.
3. For low (high) values of s profits are monotonically decreasing (increasing) in ρ. For inter-
mediate values of s profits exhibit an inverse U-shaped relationship, first increasing and then
decreasing with ρ.
We already discussed how s affects content levels: Aggregators that can more effectively pick the
highest content site increase competitiveness between the content sites, leading to higher content
and lower profits. The rather complex effect of the aggregator's click-through rate 1 − ρ on profits
is a consequence of ρ's dual impact on traffic and competitiveness: The more visitors an aggregator
sends to its link target (the lower the ρ) the higher the revenue of the link target. This is the traffic
effect of ρ which increases content levels and increases profits. At the same time, the higher the link
traffic, the higher the competition for this link between the two incumbent sites. This, secondary,
competition effect of ρ further increases content but decreases profits. When s is low, a site's content
does not significantly affect its probability of being linked to from the aggregator. The competition
effect is then weak and the traffic effect dominates, resulting in a reduction of profits as ρ grows. In
contrast, when s is high the competition effect dominates and leads to the surprising result that an
increase in ρ may lead to higher profits: As ρ increases the aggregator sends fewer visitors to content
sites through its link, but this in turn can decrease competitiveness, leading to lower content and
higher profit overall.
5.2.2 Incumbents can place links
Assume that site S produces own content cS and links to site T who produces content cT > cS . Per
our assumption, the aggregator will then also link to site cT . In such a setting the two incumbent
sites and the aggregator will each offer utility cT to their consumers. Site T will receive anchor traffic
cT
3cT+µ
plus link traffic (1−ρ)cT3cT+µ from site S and the same link traffic from the aggregator. Site S will
receive anchor traffic cT3cT+µ and no link traffic. The corresponding payoff functions take the form:
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piS =
cT
3cT + µ
ρcS − 1
2
c2S piT =
cT + 2(1− ρ)cT
3cT + µ
cT − 1
2
c2T (9)
The following proposition characterizes the form of the resulting equilibria when free linking is
allowed in a setting with two content sites and an aggregator.
Proposition 6. There exist thresholds L(ρ, s), NL(ρ, s) such that:
1. If µ ≤ NL(ρ, s), an equilibrium exists where sites do not establish links in equilibrium. Their
content levels are then given by (8).
15Contrast these functions to equation (5), which gives the payoff functions in a setting with two sites and no
aggregator.
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(a) NL(ρ) for different s (b) L(ρ) for different s
Figure 6: As the aggregator's search parameter s increases, the parameter region where no-link
equilibria are sustainable (the area below curves NL(ρ)) shrinks, whereas (for low ρ) the parameter
region where link equilibria are sustainable (the area above curves L(ρ)) expands.
2. If µ ≥ L(ρ, s), an equilibrium exists where site S links to site T and
cT =
1
2
− µ+ ρ
3
+
√
(3− 2ρ)(4µ+ 3− 2ρ)
6
>
cS =
ρcT
3cT + µ
3. There is no equilibrium in pure strategies otherwise.
The above result is analogous to Proposition 1, which describes a similar situation in a setting
without aggregators. Our main interest in this section is to explore how the effectiveness of the
aggregator in discovering quality content (s) affects the incentives of the two sites to form links vs.
to compete head-on on content. This is best accomplished by examining how the parameter regions
where no-link/link equilibria are sustainable shift as the aggregator's search parameter s increases.
Figure 6(a) plots the curve NL(ρ) for several values of s. The area below each curve corresponds
to the parameter region where no-link equilibria are sustainable for the corresponding value of s.
Observe that, for s = 0, the shape of the curve is similar to that of the corresponding curve in
settings without the aggregator (see Figure 2). As s grows, the region where it is an equilibrium
for sites to compete head-on on the basis of content shrinks. The explanation is straightforward
in light of the results of the previous section: As s increases, so does competition among content
sites. This increases content levels but reduces profits. As profits get squeezed, each content site
finds it increasingly attractive to deviate from the equilibrium, reduce its own content production
and simply place a link to the other site.
Figure 6(b) similarly plots the curve L(ρ) for several values of s. The area above each curve
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corresponds to the parameter region where link equilibria are sustainable. Observe that, for s = 0,
the shape of the curve is similar to that of the corresponding curve in settings without the aggregator
(see Figure 2). When ρ is small, as s grows the curve moves down. This means that the area where
link equilibria are sustainable expands, or, equivalently, that the area where it is profitable for the
link source to deviate from the link equilibrium shrinks. To see why this happens, let us enumerate
the reasons why the link source (say, site 2) might want to deviate from a link equilibrium. The first
reason is independent of the presence of the aggregator: when ρ is small, the link source retains little
revenue from its anchor traffic and is tempted to drop the link and compete head-on on content.
The presence of the aggregator adds an additional motivation to deviate from a link equilibrium: By
not placing a link, site 2 withholds information about site 1's superior quality from the aggregator.
If the aggregator cannot figure out quality on its own (i.e. when s is low), in the absence of this link
it would link to site 2 with higher probability. This would increase the expected traffic and revenue
flowing into site 2 and might make deviation from the link equilibrium attractive. As s increases, the
aggregator becomes more and more capable of identifying the site with the best content on its own.
Deviation from the link equilibrium will then not substantially change the expected traffic flowing
into site 2 from the aggregator, reducing the attractiveness of such deviation.
When ρ is close to 1, changes in the aggregator's search parameter have a minimal effect on the
parameter region where link equilibria are sustainable. This can be explained by observing that high
ρ means a low fraction of traffic is flowing from the link source to the link target. The presence of
the aggregator then has a small effect on both the equilibrium content investment of the link target,
as well as on the signaling implications of site 2's decision to link or not link to site 1. For that
reason, changes in the aggregator's ability to discern content quality have similarly small effects on
site 2's strategic behavior.
6 Multiple sites
We have demonstrated the most important forces governing incentives to link using models with two
or three sites. Here, we consider the case of N > 2 homogeneous sites which can simultaneously
invest in content and link to each other. The preceding sections have examined the role of the
outside option extensively, thus, to simplify the analysis, we assume µ = 0 here. At the same time,
we consider linking costs and assume that establishing a link costs KL > 0. Our first observation
regarding the link structure is that a site has no incentive to link to multiple other sites, since only
the highest quality link target affects the source's attractiveness.16 Therefore, each site has at most
one outgoing link and only the sites with the highest content quality can have incoming links. This
leads to a network structure where a number of sites have one outgoing link each (NS link sources)
to a set of NT link targets. Note that all the link targets have to have the same level of content since
16If link creation is costless then sites are indifferent between placing one or multiple links. If we assume an arbitrarily
small cost of adding a new link (e.g. the cost of writing the link summary) then sites in our setting strictly prefer
placing a single link to the best available content. In this Section we focus on small, but positive costs for linking. We
examine the case of higher linking costs in the Technical Appendix.
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links only point to the highest content site(s). Furthermore, we show that, in equilibrium, all link
targets have the same number of incoming links and that, as long as there is one link in the network,
all sites have to have either an incoming or outgoing link.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, either there are no links or sites can be divided into NS link sources and
NT link targets, where NS + NT = N , each link source has one outgoing link, and each link target
has the same number (NS/NT ) of incoming links.
The preceding lemma narrows down the network structure but we still need to determine when
such an equilibrium network is feasible. We are primarily interested in determining whether an
equilibrium with links is a possible outcome or no links are formed. Recall that, when µ = 0, a
linking equilibrium was not possible in 2-node settings (Section 4.2). We show that when N > 3
linking equilibria are possible even when µ = 0. The following proposition provides details.
Proposition 7. There exist functions NL(ρ), L1(ρ), and Li(ρ) (for i ≥ 2) such that the following
equilibria are the only ones possible:
1. No linking is an equilibrium for any KL > 0 iff N ≤ NL(ρ), where NL(ρ) is decreasing in N .
2. A linking equilibrium with NT = 1 exists for some KL > 0 iff N ≥ L1(ρ),
3. As KL → 0, a linking equilibrium with NT = i ≥ 2 exists if 2i ≤ N ≤ Li(ρ), where Li(ρ)
is decreasing in ρ and the only feasible networks are the following: (NT = 2; 4 ≤ N ≤
14), (NT = 3; N = 6), (NT = 3; N = 9), (NT = 4; N = 8), (NT = 5; N = 10), (NT =
6; N = 12), (NT = 7; N = 14).
4. Content levels of sites that do not link, that are sources, and that are targets are respectively:
cNL =
2N − 1
N2
, cS =
ρ
N
, cT =
(2NT − 1)(ρNT + (1− ρ)N)
N ·N2T
The results show that when N is sufficiently high, an equilibrium with a single target is possible,
whereas an equilibrium without links is less likely to occur. Figure 7 depicts the regions where the
different equilibria are possible as KL → 0. We focus on linking equilibria with a single target since
the results indicate that equilibria with more than one target are limited to a few cases. Indeed
when linking is cheap and N > 7, the only equilibrium with links has a single target. The intuition
behind this result is that when there is more than one link target, they have to compete for anchor
traffic and it is often appealing to give up being a link target by simply linking to one of the other
targets.
Considering the outcome with no links and the outcome with one link target, we see that, as N
increases, the different equilibria constitute a straightforward generalization of the basic case with
two sites (Section 4.2): Linking generally occurs if ρ is high enough so that link sources can capture
some of the traffic that they attract using the link target's content. However, if ρ is close to 1, link
targets are discouraged by the lack of traffic through links leading to a lower content investment
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(a) µ = 0 (b) µ = 0.5
Figure 7: Feasible no-linking and single-target linking equilibria
and no links. The results also show that, as N increases, linking is more likely. This is due to
weaker competition between sites, which has a similar effect to a stronger outside option. Although
we assume µ = 0 to derive the proposition, numerical analysis indicates that linking becomes more
likely as µ increases just as in the basic model with two sites. 17
7 Allowing targets to veto links
The dominant practice in today's Internet is that links are formed unilaterally and that link targets
have no say about another site creating a link that points to them. This is the mechanism that we
have assumed so far when analyzing the effects of links on content investments and profits. However,
there are technical and legal means by which a target can refuse a link or indicate that it does not
desire to be a link target. Examples include news sites (such as the Wall Street Journal) that do not
display some articles to visitors who do not reach such articles via the site's front page or a paywall.
Other sites do not allow search engines to crawl their content, effectively refusing to receive links
from a large aggregator. It is not surprising that such practices are becoming prevalent in light of
complaints of content creators about unfair linking practices.18 It is, thus, worthwhile to assess the
economic implications of this link refusal policy.
In this section we explore how our results change in settings where link formation requires the
17Increasing the cost of linking changes the equilibrium patterns somewhat. As KL increases, the region where
no linking is an equilibrium expands and the region with a single link target shrinks. In fact, when KL > 1/32,
no linking is always an equilibrium. The regions where linking with multiple targets is possible changes in a more
complex manner. If linking is costly enough
(
KL >
1
2
(
NT−1
N2
T
)2)
, then an equilibrium with NT link targets always
exists when N is high.We provide more details in the Technical Appendix.
18See, for example Rupert Murdoch Begins Blocking News Aggregators, Search Engines, January, 9, 2010,
http://www.mediaite.com/online/rupert-murdoch-begins-blocking-new-aggregators-search-engines/
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agreement of both the source and the target. Our main result shows that the increased competition
among content sites that is induced by the presence of aggregators makes it less likely that con-
tent nodes will unilaterally refuse links coming from aggregators, suggesting that, in most practical
settings, the technical ability to veto links is somewhat of a moot point.
We consider a setup with an aggregator and two incumbents. The setup is equivalent to that
of Section 5.2 except that the two content creators have the ability to refuse links. We assume
that after the content decisions have been made, the two sites simultaneously decide whether to
allow or refuse a potential link from the aggregator. According to our model, the aggregator will
create at most one link. Thus, if both sites allow links the aggregator will choose one of them with
probabilities that depend on the sites' content and the aggregator's search parameter s (see Section
5.2.1). If only one site allows links the aggregator will link to it. If neither site accepts links, the
aggregator will not be able to link and will attract zero traffic. We assume that µ = 0 in order to
examine the system in settings where there are high incentives to refuse links.19 We determine the
subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria that are symmetric in content choice.
Proposition 8. There always exists an equilibrium in which neither site refuses links and the content
levels are
c∗1 = c
∗
2 = cNL =
(3s+ 8)(1− ρ) + 18
36
.
This equilibrium is unique iff ρ < 1/2. Otherwise, there exists a second equilibrium in which
both sites refuse the link from the aggregator and build a content level of 3/8. Profits in the latter
equilibrium are always higher.
If ρ is not very high, then, at equilibrium, neither site refuses aggregator links. In contrast, when
ρ is high, sites have an incentive to refuse the link from the aggregator as it attracts traffic away
from content creators and sends little traffic back to them. However, sites have to coordinate so that
they both refuse the links. If one site does allow the aggregator to link to it, the other site is under
pressure to allow the link as well. Note that when refusal is a possible outcome, sites make higher
profits when they can coordinate to refuse links since, for µ = 0, the presence of the aggregator is a
net negative on the content sites (see Section 5.1).
8 Managerial implications and research opportunities
This paper is the first to take a comprehensive look at the economic implications of free hyperlinks
in settings where content sites compete for traffic and revenue and are, thus, inclined to make
interrelated strategic investments in both content and links. Our models have produced a number of
insights of relevance to industry practitioners, which, in turn suggest several opportunities for future
research:
1. Links among peer content creators can increase joint profits and content quality. One of the
most disruptive effects of the Internet to content industries has been the elimination of geographical
19When µ = 0 aggregators always generate revenue at the content creator's expense (See Section 5.1). When µ > 0,
the results are similar, but link refusal is even less likely.
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monopolies; all content sites now directly compete for every consumer. Direct competition induces
what, from the perspective of sites, are excessive investments in duplicate content. This hurts
everyone's profits without substantially benefiting the quality of content that becomes available to
consumers. We show (Sections 4.2 and 6) that linking allows sets of roughly equally capable sites to
coordinate content production in ways that increase their joint profits as well as consumer utility.
In such an equilibrium, one site invests in high quality content and all other sites link to this site.
Expecting to receive both anchor and link traffic, the site that invests in content is usually able
to produce much higher quality content than in a no-link equilibrium. Through links, this content
becomes available to all consumers, increasing the attractiveness of the entire content ecosystem
and drawing additional visitors away from outside alternatives. Although we derived this result in
a simplified setting where we assumed a single topic, one can envision an extension of this result
in a more realistic, multiple-topic setting where each site specializes in producing content on some
topics and sites link to each other to provide their readers with coverage of the remaining topics.
Our results suggest that such an industry structure, built on complementary content production,
would be better, for firms as well as for consumers, than the current situation where a number of
large media organizations are trying to be all things to all people.
2. Linking can sustain market entry of inefficient players. We find (Section 4.3) that the ability
to place free hyperlinks allows inefficient players, who would otherwise not be viable, to remain in
the market by free-riding on the content of efficient sites. If the amount of revenue that is retained by
link source nodes is substantial, this free-riding lowers incentives for quality content production and
represents an argument against the culture of barrier-free unilateral linking decisions that currently
pervades the web (see, for example http://www.right2link.org/). It has been argued that content sites
have the technical means to avoid this by selectively refusing incoming links from substantially less
efficient competitors. However, the analysis of Section 7 suggests that, unless all competing content
sites commit to such selective refusal policies, competitive pressures often force them to accept all
incoming links. This underlies the need for research on better mechanisms and policies around the
use of hyperlinks that allow content sites to harness the positive consequences of hyperlinks (e.g.
coordination among peers, avoidance of unnecessary duplicate effort) while minimizing their negative
consequences (free riding by less capable competitors).
3. The main benefit of aggregators to content creators comes from traffic expansion. Under the
natural assumption that content aggregators form links to the best available content, their presence
makes it easier for consumers to access good content, and increases the attractiveness of the entire
content ecosystem. To the extent that there exists an outside alternative that the focal content
ecosystem competes with, aggregators increase the total traffic flowing into the content ecosystem.
Most of that new traffic is directed to the highest quality content sites, increasing their profits
(Section 5.1).
4. The presence of aggregators incurs industry costs that must not be overlooked. Aggregators
represent an additional type of node that did not exist in traditional content ecosystems. Their
market entry inevitably appropriates some of the attention and revenue that would otherwise be
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shared among content creators. Their net effect is positive for content creators only if the traffic
expansion they induce is sufficient to offset the loss of attention and advertising revenue (Section 5.1).
An interesting and timely avenue for future research would be to provide an empirical assessment of
the relative magnitudes of the two effects (traffic expansion, retention of ad revenue) of well-known
aggregators. Such an assessment will be a particularly important input in the current debate between
aggregators and content creators. Our work has laid the theoretical foundations along which such
an assessment can be made.
5. Aggregators increase competition among content sites. In most cases aggregators place links
to a subset of the available content (the best content). Since links drive traffic to their target
nodes, this creates competition among content nodes. Such competition induces them to produce
better content but the impact on profits is negative (Section 5.2). This interesting second order
effect of aggregators that our study has uncovered presents an opportunity for a closer empirical
investigation.
We close by noting that this work is a first step toward understanding an arguably under-
researched area. Despite the richness of its insights, our analysis has only scratched the surface of
the full complexity of strategically formed content networks. In order to capture the fundamental
strategic processes at play we focused on relatively simple settings with a single content topic and
homogeneous consumers. We also abstracted away the search costs borne by content nodes and
aggregators in order to discover content to which they might want to form links. Last, but not least,
we restricted our attention to links that are not accompanied by side payments between the link
source and target. Although the current legal regime does not require the link source to pay the link
target (or vice versa), sponsored or paid links are commonplace in many settings and an important
source of revenue for companies like Google and Yahoo (Katona and Sarvary 2008). Understanding
how the option of side payments affects the incentives to produce content and place links in content
industries is an interesting question for future research. There are several opportunities for our results
to be extended to larger networks with more realistic features (e.g. multiple topics, consumers with
heterogeneous tastes, costly search for content by aggregators, etc.) and to study the implications
of the identified strategic interactions on the structure of the emergent content networks where the
creation and deletion of nodes themselves is endogenous on their ability to compete.
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: There are two possible types of equilibrium with respect to linking:
(i) one where there is no link between the two sites and they invest equally in content (cNL), and (ii)
one where one site invests less in content and links to the other site. As we have already determined
the potential equilibria of the first type, we will now identify the candidates for linking equilibria,
then check when neither site has an incentive to deviate from a potential equilibrium. When site i
links to site j, then its profit becomes pii→j =
cjρ
cj+cj+µ
ci − 12c2i . Comparing these two yields that site
i will link to site j iff ci ≤ ρcj(cj+µ)(1+(1−ρ))cj+µ .
Note that the right hand side of the above equation is increasing in cj and always less than
or equal to cj , yielding that only the lower quality site will establish a link and only if its quality
is sufficiently low relative to its competitor. Given the above described linking behavior, sites will
choose their content investments to maximize profits. Although the site that ends up with a higher
content does not consider linking, its profit function changes if its low content competitor decides to
link to it: pij←i =
cj+(1−ρ)cj
cj+cj+µ
cj − 12c2j . Differentiating pij←i with respect to cj yields that site j will
invest cT in content if site i links to it (as given in the proposition). Then, differentiating pii→j with
respect to ci yields that site i will invest bi→j(cj) =
ρcj
(cj+cj+µ)k
in content if it links to j, yielding the
stated ci = cS if we plug cj = cT .
To check whether sites have no incentives to deviate from the potential equilibria, we examine
whether the no linking best response would yield higher profits in the linking case and whether the
linking best response would yield higher profits in the no-link case. In the first case, the linking
equilibrium holds iff pii(bi(cT ), cT ) ≤ piS := pii→j(cS , cT ).
Let L(ρ) denote the value of µ where the above holds with equality when k = 1. The above
inequality holds for high values of µ, yielding that the linking equilibria exists iff µ ≥ L(δ, ρ).
Similarly, let NL(ρ) denote the value of µ for which pii(cNL, cNL) = pii→j(bi→j(cNL)S , cNL). Sites
do not have an incentive to deviate from the no-link equilibrium iff µ ≤ NL(δ, ρ).
Proof of Corollary 1: It is useful to start with examining the comparative statics with respect
to ρ. One can check that cS(ρ) is increasing in ρ, yielding that piS(ρ) is also increasing. Then it is
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enough to check that cS(1) ≤ cP , yielding cS(ρ) ≤ cP for any ρ. Similarly, one can check that cT (ρ)
is decreasing in ρ, and that cP ≤ cS(1). For the results depending on whether ρ is low or high, we
check the derivatives for ρ = 0 and ρ = 1 and get the stated results. Since all the functions are
continuously differentiable, we get the same results for a region of small values of ρ as for ρ = 0 and
the same results for a region of high values as for ρ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: If there are no links, then sites maximize the profit function described
in (4), yielding:
[
cNL1 , c
NL
2
]
=

[0 , 12k − µ+
√
4kµ+1
2k ] if k <
2+µ
4
[
(2k−1)(cNL2 +µ)−µ
2−k ,
6−k(2µ(k+1)+3)+
√
(2−k)2(4µ(k+1)+9)
2(k+1)2
] if 2+µ4 ≤ k ≤ −1+
√
1+4µ
µ
[12 − µ+
√
4µ+1
2 , 0] if k >
−1+√1+4µ
µ
(10)
Equation (10) shows that, for very small and very large k, that is, when the ratio of the high to
low-cost producer rises above a threshold, only the low-cost producer can stay in the market.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof follows the exact same steps as the proof of Proposition
1. However, due to the asymmetric cost, the profits and the best responses are different for the two
sites, yielding the two different thresholds for the linking equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4: When an aggregator enters the ecosystem in which two sites produce
the same amount of content and do not link to each other, the aggregator will link to one of the two
with equal probability. The aggregator will therefore have z3 = c1. The expected anchor traffic of a
content producer will decrease from c12c1+µ to
c1
3c1+µ
. However, they will receive some traffic through
the link from the aggregator in the amount of
(
1−ρ
2
)
c1
3c1+µ
, yielding a total traffic of
(
1 + 1−ρ2
)
c1
3c1+µ
which is higher than c12c1+µ iff ρ <
µ
2c1+µ
. Since content decisions are fixed in this setting a higher
traffic is equivalent to higher profits, completing the proof of part 1. In case of an aggregator entering
a market in which a low content site links to a high content site, the aggregator will link to the higher
content site to maximize the utility consumers can expect. Similarly to the previous case, we can
determine how the amount of traffic changes at the two sites. Before the aggregator enters, sites 1
and 2 receive traffic of (2−ρ)c12c1+µ and
ρc1
2c1+µ
, respectively. When the aggregator enters, these change to
(1+2(1−ρ))c1
3c1+µ
and ρc13c1+µ . Determining the sign of the change in traffic for the two sites and comparing
the profits yields the thresholds for ρ.
Proof of Lemma 1: We differentiate site 1's profit function with respect to c1. We note that
the profit function is concave, thus the f.o.c. provides the maximum. Since, we are searching for a
symmetric equilibrium, it is enough to solve ∂pi1(x,x)∂c1 = 0 and obtain
c∗1 = c∗2 =
13
36 + s
1−ρ
24 − 3µ+ρ9 +
√
9(1−ρ)2s2+12(1−ρ)(13−4ρ)s+64ρ2−(192µ+416)ρ+480µ+676
72 .
Plugging into the profit function yields the equilibrium profits. When profits would be negative
(ρ is below the stated threshold), sites do not invest in content.
Proof of Proposition 5: Straightforward analysis of the expressions derived in Lemma 1 show
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the relationship between the equilibrium content profit and the model parameters.
Proof of Proposition 6: We start by proving part 2. In the possible equilibrium where the
lower quality content creator and the aggregator both link to the higher quality content site, (9)
describes the payoff the source and the target. Differentiating piT with respect to cT yields that the
target will invest c∗T in content (as given in the proposition). Then, differentiating piS with respect
to cS yields the expression for c
∗
S . To prove the remaining, as in the proof of proposition 1, let L(ρ, s)
denote the value of µ where pii(bi(c
∗
T ), c
∗
T ) ≤ piS(c∗S , c∗T ) holds and similarly, let NL(ρ, s) denote the
value of µ for which pii(cNL, cNL) = piS(bS(cNL), cNL), using the expression given in (7) for pii(ci, cj).
Proof of Lemma 2: As shown in the discussion preceding the Lemma, each site has at most
one outgoing link. The NS sites that have outgoing links do not have incoming links and the NT
sites that have incoming links all have the same level of content. First, we show that all the link
sources have the same level of content. Since their attractiveness is determined by the quality of
the site they link to, they all attract the same amount of anchor traffic. Furthermore, their profit
function does not depend on the content level of other link sources, therefore they have the same
best response (we will see that the functional forms yield a unique best response). Given that all link
sources attract the same amount of traffic, we can show that each link target has the same number
of incoming links. Assuming that one of the link targets (T1) has more incoming links than another
one (T2) would yield a different best response for T1than for T2 since T1 would have more incoming
link traffic., but a different content level would imply that T1and T2 cannot be both link targets.
Proof of Proposition 7: We first determine the equilibrium content level when there are no
links. Sites maximize pii =
x2
x+(N−1)c∗NL −
x2
2 . Differentiating yields
2
N − 1N2 = c∗NL, leading to profits
pi∗NL =
2N−1
2N4
. For an equilibrium with no links to be feasible we have to check that no site has an
incentive to deviate by linking to another site. The optimal profit to be made in this case would
be pi′ = ρ
2
2N2
. Let NL(ρ) =
1+
√
1−ρ2
ρ2
. It is exactly below this threshold that a deviation is not
profitable as KL → 0. As KLincreases, this threshold increases as well. In order to determine the
feasibility of equilibria with links, we examine the profit function that all the NT link targets are
maximizing:
piT =
x2
(
1 + (1−ρ)(N−NT )NT
)
xN/NT + c∗T (N −N/NT )
− x
2
2
,
where c∗T is the equilibrium content level that all targets set. Differentiating and setting to zero yields
c∗T =
(N(1−ρ)+ρNT )(2NT−1)
N ·N2T
. Link sources simply maximize piS =
ρx
N − x
2
2 , yielding cS =
ρ
N . Possible
deviations are different when NT = 1 and when NT > 1. When there is only one link target, it
cannot profitably deviate by linking to one of the sources, since they have low very low content. We
only have to consider whether sources want to give up their link and compete directly in content.
The threshold below which this is not profitable as KL → 0 is denoted by L1(ρ). Note that this
deviation is always profitable for N = 2, thus L1(ρ) > 2, but for certain ρ values it is less than 3.
When NT > 1, we need to check an additional deviation, that is, when one link target decides to
become a link source and link to another link target. This deviation is always more profitable than
the one discussed before, restricting the regions where an equilibrium with NT > 1 is possible. The
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detailed analysis is covered in the Technical Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 8: We start by analyzing the last stage of the game in which sites
decide whether or not to refuse a link from an aggregator. Since we are looking for equilibria that
are symmetric in content, we can assume that the aggregator would link to both sites with equal
probability if its link is not refused by either one. Therefore, if site j decides to allow a link, the
aggregator will already have an accumulated content to attract traffic away and as long as ρ < 1,
site i can only benefit from also allowing a link. That is, both sites allowing linking is always an
equilibrium of the subgame. If site j decides to refuse the link, site i has two options. If it also
refuses the link its revenue from traffic is ci/2, whereas if it allows the link its revenue becomes
2−ρ
3 ci. It is easy to check that the former is greater iff ρ ≥ 1/2, making the refusal-refusal setting an
equilibrium of the subgame. One can then determine the equilibrium content levels in the two cases
using the results of proposition 1 and lemma 1.
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